Slashability and timing
Slashability is a timing problem as much as a loss problem. A market can observe an LRT price and still miss the period when the backing position is already committed, still slashable, or waiting for a slash settlement path. Lyrasing’s AVS-risk methodology therefore tracks when risk is captured, when it can be executed, and when collateral is actually free of that risk.
Timing surfaces
| Surface | Methodology question |
|---|---|
| Capture timestamp | At what time was the operator’s stake, voting power, or guarantee measured for the service? |
| Active guarantee window | How long does the captured stake remain slashable or economically committed? |
| Allocation delay | When does a new allocation become live, and when can it stop being counted as slashable exposure? |
| Withdrawal or epoch window | Can a user request withdrawal while the position remains slashable until an epoch or delay boundary? |
| Veto or appeal phase | Can a resolver, committee, governance path, or other process cancel or delay a slash? |
| Settlement path | Are slashed funds burned, redistributed, routed through a burner, or held in escrow before final outflow? |
Why liquidation can lag risk realization
Liquidation is reactive. It usually depends on observed price, account health, liquidator inventory, and execution availability. Slashability can become economically relevant before any of those signals move.
Examples of timing mismatch:
| Timing mismatch | Collateral implication |
|---|---|
| A service captures stake for a network epoch. | The market should not assume a later withdrawal request removes the captured slash surface immediately. |
| An operator deallocates or exits after a fault window begins. | The previous commitment may still be relevant if protocol safety delays apply. |
| A veto or appeal period exists. | The loss may be known but not final, so price can trade on uncertainty before settlement. |
| Slashed funds route through burn, redistribution, burner, or escrow logic. | Collateral impairment may be final for lending purposes before the accounting path fully clears. |
| Multiple networks can reference nearby capture times. | Execution order and guarantee windows can matter for how much stake remains slashable. |
Conservative timing policy
Lyrasing should treat timing uncertainty as a collateral-policy input:
| Evidence | Policy response |
|---|---|
| Capture time, guarantee window, and settlement path are observable. | Risk can be classified and capped with a known timing envelope. |
| Withdrawal delay is known but longer than the liquidation response model. | Reduce LTV or limit looping until the liquidation model accounts for the delay. |
| Veto or appeal process is discretionary. | Treat finality as delayed and require higher review before admission. |
| Slash amount constraints are unclear. | Do not rely on a maximum loss bound. |
| Settlement routing is unclear. | Do not count insurance, recovery, or redistribution as available coverage. |
This page deliberately avoids a numeric timing formula. A future formula would need every term to map to a concrete observation path: capture timestamp, guarantee duration, withdrawal status, veto or appeal deadline, settlement state, and the market’s liquidation response time.
Source notes
EigenLayer’s slashing documentation ties slashes to AVS-defined commitments, Operator Sets, Unique Stake, safety delays, and burn or redistribution flows. Symbiotic’s documentation uses capture timestamps, vault epochs, instant or veto slashers, slashable stake checks, and Burner routing. Those details support the timing model above and reinforce the core rule: stale timing data is risk data, not an editorial footnote.