Restaking-native money market. AVS-aware by design.

Treating eETH, ezETH, rsETH, pufETH as interchangeable ETH proxies collapses the very signal LRTs were built to expose. Two LRTs with identical staked balances can sit on radically different AVS sets — one backing a finality oracle, another underwriting a re-entrant bridge. Lyrasing reads that composition directly and computes per-LRT LTV from the slashing graph, not from the wrapping symbol.

Each supported LRT decomposes into its operator set; each operator into the AVSs they secure; each AVS into its declared slashing conditions and economic weights. The result is a vector of conditional loss bounds per LRT, refreshed on cadence and surfaced to suppliers as a transparent collateral-tier with a stated decay model.

Builders who already audit AVS opt-in graphs will find this familiar. Suppliers who care only about top-line LTV still get one number — but the number is now derived, defensible, and refusable when an LRT's AVS composition drifts past a declared envelope.

• eETH — operator-weighted~12 AVSs · LTV illustrative
• ezETH — curated AVS set~6 AVSs · LTV illustrative
• rsETH — operator-weighted~9 AVSs · LTV illustrative
• pufETH — anti-slashing hardened~10 AVSs · LTV illustrative

Numbers shown for shape only. Protocol values land with the protocol.

AVS-aware LTV bounds the exposure; the insurance pool absorbs what remains. The design routes protocol fees into the pool continuously, rather than assuming a treasury patch or retroactive socialisation after a loss. Each LRT collateral type gets its own sub-account; cross-pool fungibility is bounded by an explicit policy, not implicit.

Payouts trigger on confirmed slashing events surfaced by the same oracle pipeline that feeds the risk model. A claim drains the affected sub-account first; senior-tier suppliers are paid before junior-tier; any residual gap flips the affected LRT into wind-down rather than silently re-pricing the rest of the book.

The pool size, funding rate, drawdown ledger, and wind-down triggers are intended to be public parameters. Suppliers underwrite a declared envelope; any future emergency governance needs to be explicit in the protocol docs, not implied as an ad hoc post-loss patch.

Leverage loops are not new. What changes on Lyrasing is the bounding condition: if an operator set adds a high-risk AVS mid-position, the next loop iteration tightens automatically — no governance proposal, no oracle lag.

The insurance pool underwrites the tail: confirmed slashing events during a leveraged position draw from the per-LRT sub-account before they touch supplier principal.

1. 1

   Supply LRT

   Deposit eETH as collateral. The protocol reads its current AVS-exposure graph and derives an LTV cap from the operator set — not a flat ETH-peg governance parameter.

2. 2

   Borrow ETH

   Draw ETH up to the computed LTV ceiling. At an illustrative 70% LTV, 1 eETH yields 0.70 ETH borrow capacity.

3. 3

   Swap to LRT

   Exchange borrowed ETH for eETH via on-chain DEX routing. Spread and slippage net against loop economics before the next iteration.

4. 4

   Re-supply

   Deposit the acquired eETH as incremental collateral. The protocol re-evaluates AVS composition of the combined position at current operator weights.

5. 5

   Repeat

   Iterate until target leverage or LTV floor is reached. At a 70% ceiling the theoretical maximum gross exposure is ~3.33× (geometric series: 1 ÷ (1 − 0.70)).

Illustrative only. Actual LTV, rates, and execution costs depend on market conditions and shipped protocol parameters. Not financial advice.

The first intake is for protocol teams, AVS operators, risk researchers, and integrators who already have a concrete reason to inspect the model. The capture path opens later with attribution and storage wired.